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Executive Summary
 5G networks will see significant changes from 4G networks. While today we see only 
early stages of 5G adoption, we can see that these changes will impact security in 
network design.
 5G will increasingly bring “core” functions towards the edge (nearer the radios) of 
the network – the distinction of “core” and “non-core” is blurring already with new 
technology.
 In light of this, we must ensure our networks are designed with this in mind – our 
networks should be designed to be “intrinsically secure” without relying on 
equipment vendors.
 There is momentum behind 5G enabling “Industry 4.0” and associated increases in 
productivity, with businesses encouraged to take advantage of 5G. This means 
security issues in 5G networks will directly impact the economy, and NCSC may 
need to prepare for advising non-telecoms providers about security of private 
mobile networks.
 Some applications, such as connected vehicles, will require increased inter-
connectivity between different telecoms networks at the edge of their networks 
(where core functions will move to), for low-latency safety-related communications. 
This is a change compared to the current approach, where networks only inter-connect 
at the core, and has security implications around vendor equipment and exposure of 
telecoms companies to the vendor selections of other telecoms operators.
 The O2 outage in late 2018 has highlighted the harm to the country by disruption to 
service, and the lack of resilience in place. There are legislative gaps around telecoms 
EST0049
operators, compared with other utility operators. Telecoms networks should be 
considered as essential services, and regulated under NIS regulations. This has 
implications for other CNI, including energy utilities, which do not consider public 
mobile networks to have suitable power autonomy in the event of a “blackstart” 
incident. 
 The risks of widespread outsourcing within the telecoms sector (and other utilities 
and infrastructure sectors), as well as “sell-and-lease-back” models, should be 
considered by the committee. 
 Government policy around connectivity shows a move towards convergence of 
industrial/business focused networks and public 5G networks, as shown in the 
Rural Connected Communities competition, with a vision of new, smaller entrants 
into the telecoms market. As government policy envisages new entrants into this 
market, it is important to consider what the security implications will be, and how to 
support them.
Key Recommendations:
 Telecoms operators should be designated as Operators of Essential Services under 
NIS, in light of their importance in day-to-day life and the economy, and exposed to 
the same penalties for disruption as other OES, ensuring investment in security and 
power resilience.
 Parliament should reduce the weight it places on distinction between “core” and 
“non-core” functions of networks – networks should be secure without relying on 
vendors. Inter-connection at the network edge for low-latency vehicular 
communications means vendor choices can impact on other network operators, 
and cause cascading security issues.
 Parliament should consider whether a culture of buying “cheapest” puts the UK’s 
national interests at risk, among telecoms companies. Operators, not government, 
should bear the costs of suitable security, as they enjoy the profits from 
operating these networks. 
Challenges and Opportunities for the UK’s Telecoms Sector
(1) One particular challenge for the UK’s position in the global telecoms market is that it, for 
the most-part, doesn’t have a major domestic offering in the equipment used to build 
mobile networks. There is significant potential for export of this equipment, particularly if 
the UK were to build a reputation for building and selling high-quality, secure equipment 
around the world. This would also help the UK to ensure the security of critical 
components of its own telecoms infrastructure. The costs of verifying the security of 
third-country vendors’ equipment properly may be significant, and some of this cost may 
perhaps be better spent developing and securing domestically-developed equipment for 
telecoms networks.
(2) The UK does have strong technical knowledge and expertise in telecoms, and could 
provide a strong, compelling offer that exports worldwide, using some of our world-class 
innovation and technical expertise to provide another option for secure telecoms 
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equipment. At a time where major vendors’ offerings suffer regularly from embarrassing 
security flaws and poor design practices1, there is an opportunity for a new entrant. The 
biggest challenge that would be faced in attempting to grow a UK mobile telecoms 
equipment sector would be the culture of “cheapest over all else.” In pursuit of maximum 
profits for shareholders, telecoms companies both domestically and internationally focus 
on cost reduction as one of their top priorities, as well as elimination of capital assets. 
This needs to be balanced with the serious responsibility of securing the UK’s 
infrastructure, and suitable penalties put in place to ensure there are economic incentives 
to invest in security. This conclusion is also highlighted by the Government’s own 
Telecoms Supply Chain Review Report2.
(3) For example, one UK mobile network operator is currently planning to sell off 60,000 
mobile masts across Europe for €20bn, driving their share price up as a result of an 
expected dividend or “windfall” to shareholders as a result of the sale3. The committee 
and wider parliament should question whether it is in the strategic national interests of 
the UK for operators of mobile networks, now effectively critical national infrastructure, 
to sell these assets, and whether suitable regulatory levers are in place to ensure mobile 
network operators manage and operate this critical infrastructure with the UK’s national 
security interests at heart. Consumers may remember Woolworths, a major UK retailer, 
which collapsed partly as a result of a sale-and-leaseback arrangement carried out by its 
owners, to liquidate profits from the business4.
(4) Some international suppliers are heavily subsidised by their respective national 
governments5, and this kind of subsidy makes these suppliers hard to compete with purely 
on price. This would also potentially pose challenges in establishing a vibrant domestic-
based telecoms sector. Nonetheless, consideration should be given as to how to ensure a 
well-funded vendor is not able to use subsidised pricing to gain entry to a market, 
and the potential legal remedies available through the Competition Act 1998 and other 
relevant legislation.
Opportunities and Risks Involved in Purchasing Equipment and Services from Foreign 
Suppliers
(5) When considering the security of suppliers’ offerings, it is firstly important to remember 
that, even with equipment manufactured domestically or in neighbouring countries, the 
supply chain of modern electronics equipment and devices can be problematic for 
security. Indeed, equipment sold by major US vendors can arrive “double-boxed”, where 
the inner box contains the box labelled from the factory where the product was made. 
This raises the importance of supply chain security. There is a significant risk around 
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/huawei-cyber-security-evaluation-centre-oversight-board-
annual-report-2019
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/telecoms-supply-chain-review-terms-of-reference
3 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/26/vodafone-standalone-mobile-mast-business-towerco-
europe
4 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/3527448/Woolworths-failure-could-
trigger-high-street-collapse.html
5 https://news.yahoo.com/huawei-key-beneficiary-china-subsidies-us-wants-ended-021607000--finance.html
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the lack of supply chain diversity in electronics and other devices. The UK Telecoms 
Supply Chain Review report addresses this.
(6) One of the main challenges for MNOs and those purchasing equipment and services is a 
lack of cyber-security awareness throughout organisations. Often, formal procurement 
processes are used to purchase goods and services – these generally result in a business-
minded decision to select the cheapest credible option, particularly in some utility sectors. 
There has been, and is, an ongoing drive to cut costs within this sector and reposition 
businesses’ financials – as mentioned earlier, one UK mobile network operator has 
announced its plans to sell off its tower business in the next 18 months, for example. 
Telecoms are critical infrastructure, but are not held to that standard
(7) Our telecoms networks are now part of the fabric of society, and becoming critical to 
the economy. As payments increasingly move towards debit and credit card transactions, 
cash use reduces, and our dependence on telecoms networks for daily commerce 
increases. During the O2 outage in late 2018, an example of what the future holds was 
seen6 - Uber drivers and food delivery drivers using the O2 network were struggling to 
find work and had to hop between WiFi hotspots unaffected by the mobile network 
outage. London buses were unable to communicate their progress for bus stop timing 
screens, and journey planning websites. Pay-as-you-Go access to the London rental bikes 
was unavailable, as payments depended on the O2 network. Small businesses were unable 
to plan work, take bookings, or handle payments, as these were dependent on mobile 
network access.
(8) It is generally accepted that electricity, gas and water are utilities which are critical to 
the functioning of society – they are viewed as critical national infrastructure, and must 
conduct their operations accordingly, even where their operation is franchised out to 
privatised operators – expected standards of availability and safety remain. In the energy 
sector, for example, penalties are applied on the basis of “customer minutes lost”. There 
are, for the most-part, not similar systems in place for telecoms networks, aside from 999 
outages.
(9) The potential reach on impacts of a mobile network outage should be considered – the 
vulnerable and the elderly (particularly those who are mobile and able to leave the 
home) may rely on cellular-based fall detection and alert systems. Lone working alarms 
and monitoring systems utilise mobile connectivity for staff not based at a single location. 
The rise of tele-health and similar technologies presents similar concerns, particularly 
with an aging population and elderly care crisis. Mobile telecoms based healthcare and 
medical solutions offer simple “fit and forget” solutions to help ensure the welfare of the 
elderly as they choose to grow old in their own homes. Many consider tele-medicine as 
one of the opportunities enabled by 5G networks. This situation will become more 
critical with the PSTN switch-off, an area Ofcom is exploring7.
6 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-08/o2-s-all-day-outage-caused-havoc-in-ways-
consumers-didn-t-expect
7 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations-and-statements/category-2/access-emergency-organisations-
power-cut
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(10) Ofcom’s 2017 Connected Nations report highlights that the majority of security 
incidents related to voice services (including access to 999 services), and that “the 
majority of incidents are caused by the failure of hardware components, the loss of power 
supply, or by software bugs”. They highlight in particular that “The resilience of mobile 
networks, in particular to major power disruption, remains a key concern”. With 70% of 
calls to 999 made from mobile phones in 2017, mobile telecoms are now essential 
services, and save lives.
(11) To ensure value for money for the taxpayer and billpayer, it is important to ensure that 
all sectors of industry are able to take make the most of telecoms networks. As electricity 
distribution network operators increasingly look to improve connectivity in their networks 
to create a “smart grid”, suitable for the mass adoption of electric vehicles and other 
low-carbon technologies, the ability to avoid reinventing the wheel using billpayer 
money by using infrastructure is clearly advantageous for all concerned. The ability for 
utilities to utilise public mobile network infrastructure would therefore be beneficial for 
all concerned. Due to the lack of power resilience in mobile networks, as identified by 
Ofcom in the 2017 Connected Nations report, this is currently not possible. A network 
capable for use in control of would have to meet the requirements for “black start” 
resilience – the ability to still be operational throughout, after power was lost nationally 
for a period of several days. Otherwise, such a network would not offer sufficient 
resilience to be used in this way.
(12) Even if meeting full black start resilience standards was not deemed feasible by 
operators, enhanced power resilience is clearly necessary. People depend on telecoms 
networks to be operational, and the systematic lack of power resilience in mobile 
network cell sites is a relatively “hidden” problem the committee should explore further, 
given the growing importance mobile networks have in daily life.
(13) The business pressures on those operating critical telecoms infrastructure sometimes 
create challenges and conflicts – in 2008, an Ofcom spokesperson confirmed they were 
not aware of any requirement for mobile operators to provide backup power to mobile 
base stations8.
(14) Ofcom’s 2017 Connected Nations report highlights that the majority of security 
incidents related to voice services (including access to 999 services), and that “the 
majority of incidents are caused by the failure of hardware components, the loss of power 
supply, or by software bugs”. They highlight in particular that “The resilience of mobile 
networks, in particular to major power disruption, remains a key concern.” 
(15) Ofcom’s 2018 Connected Nations report notes that fixed exchanges and core network 
nodes would typically have backup power to support normal operation for between 2 and 
7 days, with refuelling of generators able to continue this on an ongoing basis. “Hub” 
sites, usually base stations which other base stations use to connect through to the 
network would usually have 4 to 8 hours of battery protection, with on-site or temporary 
generators used if a longer outage were experienced. The majority of mobile cell sites 
have around 10 minutes of battery runtime. This effectively allows for a “graceful 
shutdown”, rather than providing any level of resilience.
8 https://www.networkworld.com/article/2284316/backup-power--not-required--in-u-k--base-stations.html
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(16) This issue was highlighted clearly during the “blackout” over large parts of the UK on 
9th August 2019, with the Telegraph reporting mobile phone and internet connectivity 
going “dead” as masts seemingly lost power. 
(17) In terms of power resilience, Street cabinets or other fixed nodes in the network 
would usually have battery backup of 2 to 24 hours. Ofcom has noted the risk that in 
some areas, “service, including the ability to call the emergency services, could fail 
immediately”. This has significant public safety and national security implications.
(18) In the major 2015 power outage in Lancaster, the Royal Academy of Engineering’s 
“Living Without Electricity”9 report documents that “Most mobile phone coverage was 
lost within an hour”, and also reported that “many people who had replaced their 
traditional handsets with cordless phones were unable to connect”. Internet services 
were mostly unavailable, and home routers were obviously unpowered, leading to an 
effective outage for most people. Electronic payment systems were non-functional, and 
“most ATM machines did not work”. The ability to get access to fuel was also 
hindered, as “garages could not sell petrol or diesel as pumps are driven by electricity”. 
This may present challenges for operators planning to fuel generators without their own 
power-resilient plans for fuel supplies.
The Risk of Complex Third-Party Dependencies
(19) Ofcom’s 2018 Connected Nations report highlights the general lack of long-term 
runtime of mobile cell sites, as well as the external dependency of O2 on an Ericsson 
network component, where a certificate expired. This reflects one of the main challenges 
for mobile networks when purchasing equipment – the need to verify that it operates 
independent of the supplier or vendor’s own operations.
(20) It is unclear the extent to which mobile networks have outsourced their capabilities to 
operate and maintain their own networks, 
(21) When considering the impact of cyber-security threats, it is important to also consider 
the implications of availability impacts by more conventional or passive routes. With 
availability an important consideration in the running of telecoms networks, it is now 
more important than ever to ensure our infrastructure can run with full autonomy, 
even in the absence, or lack of cooperation of, external vendors and suppliers. Were 
Ericsson not to have promptly responded and resolved the issue, it is unclear how this 
situation would have played out; namely whether or not O2 was able to issue a new 
valid certificate itself in replacement for the expired one.
(22) With a drive to outsource support costs from networks, many functions in the 
operation of telecoms networks have been outsourced. Ofcom is aware of these, and has 
issued guidance to this effect. In a document entitled “Updating Ofcom’s guidance on 
network and service security”, obligations under 105A(4) of the Communications Act are 
clarified to not be excused where a communications provider outsources work, and 
the telecoms operators are required to regularly ensure these continue to be met10. 
9 https://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/living-without-electricity
10 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/108856/Statement-review-security-guidance.pdf
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From the perspective of national infrastructure resilience, however, the prevalence of 
outsourcing, as well as the adequacy of controls in place should be considered. In 
particular, attention should be paid to any situations where outsourcing takes place across 
national boundaries, to avoid scenarios like that seen in Sweden, where information 
which was highly sensitive to national security (including identifies of undercover 
operatives) was transferred to a third country by an outsourced provider seeking to reduce 
costs of their operations11.
(23) By looking at operators overseas, we can see the extent to which outsourcing of 
critical functions of telecoms operators’ businesses has occurred12. Outsourcing 
providers or vendors are a major route of compromise into networks and businesses13
, with on average 59% of organisations having been breached as a result of a vendor14. 
Where telecoms infrastructure is relied upon to the extent it is today in the UK, this risk 
should be carefully monitored and managed by regulation, and this is an area the 
committee may be wise to explore.
(24) When this is considered in line with the UK Telecoms Infrastructure Review Report’s 
observations about “insufficient incentives to internalise the costs and benefits of 
security”, it should be particularly concerning for the committee to note the potential for 
widespread outsourcing to result in reductions in security for the UK’s telecoms 
networks. 
Regulation, Legislation & Collaboration
(25) Concerns around security and resilience can be, to some extent, addressed by way of 
carrying out technical investigation, like GCHQ/NCSC currently do via the Huawei 
Cyber Security Evaluation Centre. This is an area for potential collaboration and 
cooperation with other like-minded countries, since detection of vulnerabilities within 
vendor-supplied telecoms products is an area where “more eyes” help to reduce the 
number of undetected vulnerabilities. Nation state actors already look for vulnerabilities 
in telecoms and other infrastructure equipment, therefore cooperating with others on 
detection of these vulnerabilities may help to improve the security of UK telecoms assets.
(26) There is a complex landscape for cyber-security, in particular around telecoms 
companies. While there are clear needs for separation of responsibilities, it appears 
questionable how effective this regime is for UK telecoms companies. Telecoms 
companies, for example, are not currently subject to NIS, despite operators of “radio 
and telecommunications systems, computer systems and networks” in the water transport 
sector being covered, due to recital 7 excluding those providing public communication 
networks or publicly available electronic communication services governed by other 
regulations around security15. EC Directive 2002/21/EC (March 2002) sets out the 
framework for regulating providers of telecommunications networks. It is worth noting 
11 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/ibm-sweden-data-outsourcing.html
12 https://ultra.news/s-e/32708/wipro-wins-5-year-outsourcing-deal-telenors-bangladesh-unit
13 https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/wipro-breach-how-to-stay-protected-when-your-managed-
services-provider-gets-hacked
14 https://www.apnews.com/556444d2cc114ea9a8ceda8f747b329c
15 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016L1148&from=EN
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that this regulation does not specifically address cyber-security, and the UK’s 
Communications Act, namely Sections 105A to 105D, appears to provide the cyber-
security regulation around telecoms providers16, but caps the penalty to £2 million, far 
below penalties in the NIS directive for operators of essential services. Telecoms 
services are essential to day-to-day life, business, economic activity, and societal function 
in the UK.
Closing Remarks
(27) I particularly welcome the publication of the UK Telecoms Supply Chain Review 
Report (July 2019), and in particular highlight its recognition of the need for the UK to 
deliver a strong policy response, the challenges around a limited number of foreign-
based suppliers, and the tensions between commercial factors and cyber-security, which 
currently allow short-term financial thinking to outweigh the important duty to the 
nation’s security that telecoms operators hold.
(28) I would add that there is inherent supply-chain centralisation and concentration 
around a number of regions of the world, and that the committee should explore the 
implications of these – continued availability in an era of increased international tensions 
and volatility should be considered, as well as the cyber-security considerations around 
low-level components being sourced from these countries.
(29) With reference to the statement around “the complexity of delivering, monitoring and 
enforcing contractual arrangements in relation to security,” I suggest that the committee 
not take this into consideration – while absolutely correct, telecoms operators operate 
profitable businesses delivering services which government recognises to be essential 
to the economy and growth. If telecoms operators struggle to enforce contractual 
arrangements around cyber-security, arguably they should not be outsourcing such 
activities. 
(30) When providing critical infrastructure, it is important for Government to recognise 
its mandate and right to regulate in the national interest, even if this were to mean 
increased costs, or barriers in the path to the wholesale outsourcing of network operations 
which we are seeing. The responsibility lies with the operator to ensure the security of 
their network. Challenges in contracting others to carry this out mean the operator should 
consider taking on these tasks internally. This is backed up by Ofcom guidance on the 
subject, namely their document titled “Updating Ofcom’s guidance on network and 
service security”, which clarifies that obligations under 105A(4) of the 
Communications Act are not excused where a communications provider outsources 
work, and the telecoms operators are required to regularly ensure these continue to be 
met17. From the perspective of national infrastructure resilience, however, the prevalence 
of outsourcing, as well as the adequacy of controls in place should be considered.
(31) The complexity and potential interdependency of telecoms networks and other 
critical infrastructure (including power networks) should not be overlooked, 
particularly where there is potential for circular dependencies to form – if power network 
16 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/105A
17 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/108856/Statement-review-security-guidance.pdf
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operators depend on mobile infrastructure to reach remote assets, and a power outage 
prevents connectivity, this could hamper the UK’s ability to respond to a blackstart 
incident.
(32) The rise of mobile network-based payments handling should be considered by the 
committee, particularly for the UK’s economic resiliency. As cash usage falls, and card 
usage consequently rises, there is a risk of the economy becoming over-reliant on 
technology which is not legally deemed essential under the NIS directive. Other 
infrastructure (such as transport) depending on fixed and mobile networks (such as TFL 
buses) should not be overlooked. The impact of a widespread mobile network failure 
has now been partially seen during the O2 outage in December 2018, and the 
committee should look at this example to consider the UK’s ability to resist a targeted, 
deliberate attack by a belligerent party or actor.
(33) When considering 5G, it is important to note that we are unlikely to see a 6G in the 
same form of nationwide roll-out of an entirely new generation of network, with new 
equipment, at significant capital expense. Mobile network operators are already looking 
at ways to monetise their existing fixed assets and infrastructure, meaning it is 
questionable whether there would be sufficient money to fund another roll-out in the 
future. Site and asset sales show that we may be reaching the point of inadequate returns 
on nationwide infrastructure deployments for mobile networks. It is therefore essential to 
ensure that 5G is architected and deployed with a view to the future, and ensuring it 
remains secure going forwards, since supply chain or vendor decisions taken today will 
have lasting repercussions into the future.
(34) An effective focus on the development and growth of new, smaller entrants, is 
particularly welcomed, and mention of the DCMS 5G Testbeds and Trials program is 
important – these trials have made considerable progress, and it is worth policy-makers 
engaging with those who have been involved in these trials. I would be happy to 
participate in follow-up on this topic.
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